

**Social cohesion, welfare and civil society: Some implications of the case of Northern
Ireland**

Paper Presented at the annual Irish Social Policy Association conference,

Dundalk Institute of Technology

October 2006.

By:

Nick Acheson

Centre for Voluntary Action Studies,

Social and Public Policy Research Institute

University of Ulster

Email: N.Acheson@ulster.ac.uk

Social cohesion, welfare and civil society: Some implications of the case of Northern Ireland¹

Nicholas Acheson

Abstract

Recent literature on the third sector or civil society organizations in contemporary societies has focused both on their developing role in the reconstruction of welfare states in an era of globalization and on a neo-Tocquevillian approach that emphasizes their social integrative and participatory function. A central feature of these narratives has been that civil society organisations are simultaneously sources of welfare and of integration and that in an era of globalization, the integrative missions of welfare states can be renewed through the greater participation of these organizations in the delivery of welfare programmes. The way they do this is through providing the seedbed of norms and networks that scale up to more generalised trust, the socialization hypothesis.

This paper considers the socialization hypothesis in the light of recent evidence on the role of civil society in the welfare mix in Northern Ireland, a region which is fully integrated into the UK welfare state and which has experienced a period of intense and violent conflict over deep ethno-religious divisions in the 30 years from the late 1960s. Greater levels of participation of civil society organisations in welfare delivery since the early 1990s have been accompanied by deepening levels of distrust and hostility between the two main communities in Northern Ireland. The paper discusses the evolving role of civil society organisations in the context of the development of the welfare state in Northern Ireland. It presents new quantitative and qualitative evidence on civil society and communal divisions and will consider some implications of this evidence.

Introduction

Recent literature on the third sector or civil society organizations in contemporary societies has focused both on their developing role in the reconstruction of welfare states in an era of globalization and on a neo-Tocquevillian approach that emphasizes their social integrative and participatory function (Anheier, 2004; Surrender, 2004; Evers and Laville, 2004; Kendall, 2003).

There is widespread agreement in the literature that governments have been re-engineering welfare state institutions as a response to globalisation (Lewis, 2004; Surrender, 2004). In their respective reviews of the relevant literature both these authors identify the impact of the growth of flexible labour markets, the free movement of capital and the outsourcing of jobs to other jurisdictions, linked to an ageing population as the central trends to which governments have had to respond. In Western welfare states there has been some convergence in policy towards active rather than passive welfare and a stress on an enabling role for the state

¹ This paper is based on a research project funded by the Community Relations Council in Northern Ireland and the Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister in the Northern Ireland government. The funders' support is gratefully acknowledged. The project was a collaboration between the author and Professor Arthur Williamson of the Centre for Voluntary Action Studies and Professors Maurice Stringer and Ed Cairns of the Social Research Centre, all at the University of Ulster. Their collegial contribution is also gratefully acknowledged.

and a renewed focus on the role of welfare in securing greater social cohesion (Lewis, 2004:179; Pierson, 1998).

At the same time the processes of governance have been reformed through a ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes, 1994), in which power has moved downwards from the national to the local, sideways to alternative institutions particularly in the private sector and quasi non-governmental organizations, and upwards to supra-national institutions such as (in the European context) the European Commission.

This ‘recalibration’ (Pierson, 2001) has been accompanied by a reconceptualization of third sector organizations as partners with governments in the production of welfare goods rather than as alternative, and more market sensitive, providers of services on behalf of government (Lewis, 2004). The underpinning assumption that voluntary agencies “can be both agents of efficient and effective service delivery and institutions in civil society enforcing civic virtue, social cohesion and participation” applies across many different political ideologies and national circumstances (Anheier, 2004: 118-119). It is reflected in policies in many anglophone countries in the world (New Zealand, Australia and Canada) as well as the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe. Whilst this approach has been most clearly articulated in the UK ‘Third Way’, it is also apparent in other European countries with more corporatist welfare regimes (Esping Andersen, 1990), for example France, the Netherlands and Germany (Anheier, 2004).

The purpose of this paper is to consider some implications for this assumption of the counter-factual case of situations of unresolved ethnic competition and conflict. Drawing on new evidence from Northern Ireland, I argue that such cases should not be viewed as unimportant aberrations from the norm, but that institutions in civil society can only “enforce” civic virtue subject to certain conditions to do with the continuing stability of the political settlements underpinning the purposes of welfare states at national level. The case of Northern Ireland should be considered as particularly apposite in this regard as it has been fully integrated into the UK welfare state settlement since the late 1940s. It thus provides a useful testing ground for the integrative hypothesis of welfare states in general and the more recent view that the integrative function of welfare states can be strengthened by increasing the salience of voluntary or third sector organizations.

The paper briefly reviews recent literature on the hypothesis that third sector organizations can help integrate societies in ways that are not as readily available to governments acting on their own, paying particular attention to critiques of the way in which the concept of social capital has been used to support this hypothesis. The paper will argue that the relationship between the elements of social capital are not straightforward and are mediated by political and structural variables that can break the link between networks and norms on the one hand and generalized trust on the other. It will then introduce and discuss the relevance of the case of ethnically divided societies and Northern Ireland as a particularly useful exemplar in this context. It will present evidence from recently completed research in Northern Ireland to show both the extent to which third sector organizations are embedded in a deeply divided civil society and the ways in which they participate in welfare discourses and practices that enable people to manage relationships in this fractured society that at the same time enable the perpetuation of divisions. The significance of these findings for understanding the developing role of the third sector in the reconstruction of welfare is then discussed and conclusions offered.

Civil society, social capital and the integrative function of welfare states:

One central feature of narratives of welfare state modernisation has been that civil society organisations can be simultaneously sources of welfare and of integration and that in an era of globalization, the integrative missions of welfare states can be renewed through the greater participation of these organizations in the delivery of welfare programmes and the creation of jobs through the social economy. The underlying hypothesis is that civic participation in voluntary associations is an important and

independent source of social cohesion that may be encouraged through well designed and sensitive public policies. The mechanism through which this is said to occur is the creation of social capital. This concept, as it has been applied and interpreted in policy, has become an important grounding for current developments in policies that look towards third sector organizations as a source of integration in societies that appear to be fragmenting in the face of globalization.

The concept of social capital was catapulted from relative sociological obscurity in the early 1990s by its use in explaining regional differences in economic and social performance in Italy (Putnam, 1993). While a deeply contested concept, it was its use in this and later in the USA (Putnam, 2000) that provided much of the intellectual underpinning of the development of public policy towards the voluntary sector around the turn of the millennium.

Putnam discovered a close association between a dense network of voluntary associations that encouraged horizontal ties among people from differing backgrounds and the relative economic success of northern Italy when compared to southern Italy. In contrast there he found economic and social stagnation associated with weak associational life dominated by hierarchical social relations. Putnam draws a crucial distinction between what he terms bonding and bridging social capital (Putnam, 1993, 2000). The former refers to social capital generated amongst like minded people and the latter to social capital that bridges other social divisions, for example, class, ethnic origin or age. Social capital in this view is defined as consisting in three dimensions, namely, networks, social norms of reciprocity and generalized trust. It thus encompasses social relationships, the rules governing those relationships and attitudinal factors contributing to generalized trust. Putnam argued that the trust that was generated in face to face interactions in the life of associations that drew people together from different backgrounds could be generalized to other situations and could be drawn on by people addressing collective problems. He goes on to argue that “networks of civic engagement that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation” (Putnam, 1993: 175). It is this factor that is a necessary condition for consolidating and deepening democracy (Putzel, 1997: 947). Hence, the policy proposition that investing in voluntary action to generate social capital (thus understood) is a key component in building and sustaining a successful society.

An important addition to Putnam’s conceptualization was made by Woolcock (1998) who argued for linking social capital to refer to the vertical ties between networks and power elites and government. Social capital should thus be conceived as possessing three elements, social networks, norms of reciprocity and generalized trust, and coming in three types, bonding, bridging and linking. But it has been argued that the attractiveness of this set of ideas for policy-making lay in the way it offered a link to a simpler, less complicated past.

The genius of Putnam (2000) was to link de Tocqueville’s nineteenth century description of a largely self-organizing participatory local society to issues of social fragmentation and isolation...It identified a problem (erosion of social capital) and offered a solution from the ‘past’ (voluntary associations, community), suggesting tradition and continuity to an unsettled present (Anheier, 2004: 118).

While there is now a large body of evidence to link levels of generalized trust in societies and the density of voluntary associations (Anheier and Kendall, 2002; Anheier, 2004), this evidence does not amount to proof that the source of generalized trust lies in the face to face interactions that take place within these associations. It is equally possible that cause and effect flows in the opposite direction. The view that voluntary associations are an independent source of social capital rests on the assumption that there is a socialization effect whereby participants in associational activities learn civic ‘habits of the heart’, and both learn to trust one another in the group and then to generalize that trust to unknown others. Yet, as Hooghe (2003: 91) tartly observes, there is no evidence whatsoever to support this assumption.

Indeed, citing evidence that higher levels of trust are to be found in the most egalitarian societies than in those with greater levels of income inequality and greater reliance on means-testing of social security benefits, some have argued that redistributive welfare states are the main source of trust and that it is this that encourages people to join associations (Stolle, 2003; Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). Furthermore, as Stolle (2003) has also noted, so far there is no convincing theory to explain why trust generated in small group settings should generalize to other settings. She suggests that voluntary associations are consumers of social capital in that people with high levels of social capital self-select into associations. This is one explanation of why societies with highly interventionist and universal welfare states also have high levels of voluntary association.

In contrast to the socialization hypothesis, it is as plausible to argue that voluntary associations, with their particular interests and their tendency to draw like minded people together, should be the last place to look for the source of generalized trust and should instead be viewed as a particular outcome of trust generated elsewhere. People who are more trusting of others for other reasons self select into associations.

Early critics of Putnam's initial formulation suggested that he had fundamentally misunderstood Italian history and pointed to the crucial importance of politics as an intervening variable in the link between the level and kinds of associational activities and the effectiveness and functioning of local governance (Tarrow, 1996; Harriss and de Renzio, 1997). In this view voluntary associations would be better understood as consumers of social capital rather than producers.

An important European literature has found that Putnam's view that social capital is declining seems not to apply in Europe. Thus Hall (1999) found that there had been no noticeable decline in Britain in the propensity of people to form associations, or of social capital since the Second World War. He argues that state led reform to the education system was decisive in maintaining high levels of social capital in Britain through the mechanism of upward social mobility into an expanding middle class that followed the introduction of universal access to free secondary education.

Van Oorshot and Arts (2005) found no evidence in Europe to support the crowding out hypothesis. Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) addressed what they termed the Scandinavian problem – the most developed welfare states have the highest ratings of social capital. They conclude that the biggest determinant of social capital is the design of welfare state institutions. Wollebaek and Selle (2002) considered the case of Norway and question whether active participation in associations is necessary for social capital formation.

Even in his initial formulation, Putnam was careful to note that his model was based on face to face interactions among people in associations brought together from differing class and ethnic backgrounds; that it was (to use his terminology) bridging, not bonding social capital that had the powerful impact that he claimed for it. It was the absence of such associations in the Italian south that he linked to its relatively poor economic performance. Yet this distinction begs the question as to the relationship between the three elements of social capital – norms, networks and trust. The claim that it is life within associations that generates the norms and networks that lead to trust assumes that the relationship between the three is linear and non controversial. There has been a tendency in the application of social capital to public policy to make that assumption with the corollary of a general claim for the integrative potential of third sector organizations in contemporary welfare states.

But the assumption cannot be sustained. As with other social and economic resources, both knowledge of, and access to, the networks of bridging and linking social capital are differentiated by other factors such as class and membership of minority excluded groups (Foley and Edwards, 1999).

Furthermore, Anheier and Kendall (2002: 355) query whether there is a straightforward relationship between networks, social norms and trust and conclude by noting:

The central point is that the relationship between social capital and trust is highly conditional, i.e., dependent on the structure of civil society and the legitimacy of the political system, and indirect, i.e., mediated by processes like social inclusion and participation

Reinforcing the earlier point that welfare states, underpinned by stable political settlements play a central part in explanations of societies with high levels of generalized trust, Anheier and Kendall go on to note a qualification crucial to the argument in this paper, that the relationship between voluntary associations and trust breaks down in those cases “where the legitimacy of the social and political order is questioned in fundamental ways” (ibid: 355). These authors quote the example of Bosnia, but their remarks might apply equally to any society fractured by ethnic and/or national divisions which also lack stable political settlements.

Lewis (2004) concludes that for social capital to flourish, it needs to be embedded in and linked to formal political institutions. She writes: “social capital is held not to exist independently in the realm of civil society, which in turn means that the capacity of citizens to develop cooperative ties may also be determined by state policies” (ibid: 176). She might have gone on to say that the capacity of the state in this respect is itself determined by the legitimacy of the political order on which it is based. The effect of these critiques of the Putnamian position has thus been to erode its explanatory power.

Comparative social policy tends to proceed on the assumption that national communities are encapsulated by nation states, each with a single and distinct history and a distinct approach to the problem of integration, each of which can usefully be compared with one another. Comparative studies in this area are conducted on the basis of nationally available comparative data; within each nation state a single narrative of welfare state development emerges within which the role of the welfare state is constructed². What is troubling about this debate is that much of it is conducted on the assumption that each nation state contains a single national community. In this debate the problematic is that globalization has brought with it a fragmentation of the national community through migration and changing work patterns thus requiring a recalibration of the welfare state to enable it to recapture its integrative function in respect to this assumed national community. The third sector is cast in a national role, both in respect of national communities (evident in Putnam’s work) and in respect of national welfare states (Esping Andersen, 1990; Salamon and Anheier, 1998).

One effect of this tradition in comparative scholarship has been to give insufficient attention to the impact of fragmentation and division within particular states. This might be considered particularly unfortunate as once analysis turns to countries outside of liberal ‘Western’ democracies, then states that are multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, or multi-religious or all three become increasingly common³. The introduction of political variables into the analysis of the relationship between civil society, welfare and social order makes it all the more necessary to factor in the analysis of cases where the political order breaks down in the face of internal fragmentation.

The case of Northern Ireland

It is argued that the case of Northern Ireland provides a particularly illuminating jumping off point for developing such an analysis. For the final 30 years of the 20th century Northern Ireland experienced,

² See Taylor (2004) for an account of the development of the third sector in the UK, based wholly on English experience which ignores national differences within the UK.

³ Nigeria, South Africa and India are three examples that come readily to mind

(with the exception of the former Yugoslavia) the most intense violent conflict over national identity experienced in Europe during those years. Over 3,500 people were killed and about 48,000 injured (Hayes and McAllister, 2004). The social and economic costs have been formidable exemplified by high levels of spatial and social segregation between the two main ethno-sectarian communities, matched by deep distrust, and significant levels of poverty and gross inequalities in wealth and income (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). Measured by income distribution, Northern Ireland is among the most unequal regions in Europe (Hillyard et al, 2003).

Since the early 1990s, there have been a series of self-conscious attempts by the state to support the development of and then engage with elements within civil society to help manage the conflict, address some of its social consequences and to help build the peace (Kearney and Williamson, 2001). Funding from regional government sources to voluntary and community organizations increased from just under £17m in 1988/89 to over £70m in 2001/02, an increase in over 400% (Acheson, Harvey, Kearney and Williamson, 2004). This was apart from public expenditure to voluntary organizations providing contracted out public services, which also increased by a similar margin over the same period. In addition it is estimated that over £50m went to the voluntary and community organizations between 1994 and 1999 from mainstream EU structural funds (Acheson et al, 2004). This large public investment in voluntary action was matched by a strong growth in the numbers of organizations. There are estimated as being between 3,500 and 5,000 viable organizations or associations for a population of about 1.6m people, over half of which have been established since 1986 (NICVA, 1998, 2001, 2005). Together, they provide employment for over 29,000 people, 4.5% of the workforce, and have a combined asset base of over £750m (NICVA, 2005).

Despite the substantial government investment in voluntary and community organizations, community divisions have deepened significantly since 1998. Spatial segregation has accelerated and support for cross-community integration seems to be declining. Related to this development, trust between the two communities has fallen further, and optimism about continued progress towards a more peaceful society in the future is low (Harbison and Lo, 2004; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). There is a continuing and low level degree of sectarian violence directed at both people and property. These developments suggest that there has been no straightforward return on the investment in civil society in that it has not delivered a more stable and integrated society.

The intractable nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland, its intensity and its parochialism are often baffling to the outsider. Embedded in the long history of relations between Britain and Ireland, it is a manifestation of the unfinished and uncertain nature of that relationship which has had ethnic, religious and colonial components (Ruane and Todd, 1996; Wright, 1996). When the rest of the island of Ireland achieved formal independence in 1922, the north-eastern corner remained part of the United Kingdom. This was the part that had been settled by Scottish and English settlers at the start of the 17th century who were Protestant rather than Roman Catholic in religion and who remained intensely loyal to their Scottish and English roots. They remained culturally and religiously separated from the native Irish people whom they were nevertheless unable to oust completely. Their numbers were, however, sufficient to force the UK state to partition the island of Ireland, retaining as part of the UK, the areas where the settlers' descendants were sufficiently numerous to defend successfully. The conflict remains in essence one between competing ethno-sectarian groups over political identity (British or Irish) and is played out over competing claims over territory and space.

Most people in Northern Ireland live their lives in segregated spaces, a process that predates the onset of violence in the early 1970s, but which accelerated dramatically from that point on (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). In the case of Belfast, the largest city, just 10.7% of Catholics and 7.0% of Protestants live in areas

that could be described as ‘mixed’⁴, that is places that are between 41% and 60% Protestant or Catholic (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006: 60). In addition, there is a class profile to the degree of segregation in that at least 90% of the population is comprised of one group or the other in 98% of social housing in Belfast, whereas the overall figure for Northern Ireland is 71% (Ibid: 60). Patterns of avoidance are deeply embedded in the every day routines of most of the population (Darby, 1986; Murtagh, 2002).

The pragmatic utility of avoidance may be emphasized by noting that 84.25% of all deaths from violence associated with the conflict within the Belfast urban area occurred within 1,000 metres of an interface between segregated communities and over two thirds were within 500m (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006: 73). However, as Darby (1986) points out, in many areas of Northern Ireland avoidance is not a practical option. In such cases, Darby (1986) notes the importance of selective contact and functional integration. Contact between the ethnic groups can be maintained in certain carefully controlled circumstances, but not in others. In some circumstances, Darby suggests that there can be a considerable degree of functional integration. He notes the importance of shared business interests and shared leisure activities among some middle class people and he also suggests that there is evidence that common material or social interests can overcome sectarian suspicion (Darby, 1986:172). Such cross community associations of people with shared interests are often more viable than are associations established with cross community contact specifically in mind. Integration tends however, to be limited to the function in which people come together.

The UK welfare state and ethno-sectarian divisions

Whilst there was a substantial degree of devolved responsibility for domestic matters to the Northern Ireland government between 1922 and 1972, nevertheless the main features of the welfare state settlement achieved in Britain immediately after the Second World War were imported to Northern Ireland with little modification. These included health care free at the point of use, free and compulsory secondary education, national insurance and a safety net of means tested payments for those without other means. The permissive and regulatory basis of the UK welfare state settlement helped consolidate the role of many existing third sector organizations and provided space for the emergence of new ones around a ‘space’ for welfare action in spheres where state intervention was weak. In the context of Northern Ireland, it created a welfare orientated ‘space’ for the third sector that was viewed as neutral in respect to ethno-religious divisions. Theorists of the British welfare state emphasised the extension of social rights to the national community, based upon a changed social contract between the state and citizens of that national community (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992; Titmuss, 1958, 1976). But the liminal status of Northern Ireland derived from its occupation of the borders of the national community, with the Protestant population perceiving itself as being part of that community and the Catholic (descendants of the native Irish population) as outside of it.

The differential impact of the welfare state on the two communities in Northern Ireland illustrates how the integrative function of welfare state institutions may be said to depend upon a pre-existing national community, a notion that is predicated on the existence of people who are not part of that community. The point was well understood by the Protestant leadership of the Northern Ireland government of the time which was able simultaneously to implement the main welfare state reforms whilst continuing highly discriminatory policies in respect of the minority Catholic community. Whilst in Britain, Hall (1992) found that national stocks of social capital had remained high in part as a consequence of the large scale recruitment to the middle classes from the working class through the introduction of free secondary education, in Northern Ireland the same factor simply changed the relationship of each of the two main communities to the state rather than with each other. Indeed the advent of a newly articulate and educated Catholic elite by the end of

⁴ The terms ‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic’ are used here in the way commonly understood in Northern Ireland, as signifiers of communal affiliation; their use does not imply that the conflict is about religion.

the 1960s was a significant precipitating factor in the breakdown of the political order at that time. Thus the same factor that was integrative in Britain was disintegrative in Northern Ireland.

The public policy response

The introduction of direct rule from London in 1972 was followed by a determined attempt to modernise public administration and free it from discriminatory practices that had been its hallmark under the previous devolved administration. This was carried out on technocratic assumptions that declared themselves blind to the divisions and conflict that addressed social problems on the basis of presented social need rather than on membership of any communal groups (Murtagh, 2003). In practice, however, public administrators had to accommodate to divisions and this was done in a variety of ways. Table One suggests a simple typology of types of response.

Table One
Public policy responses to ethno-sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland

| Policy arena | Response |
|---------------------------|---|
| Housing | A single unitary housing authority administers social housing on a largely segregated basis |
| Education | Single policy, delivered through two parallel school systems, one each for the two main ethnic groups. Further and higher education is institutionally integrated, although in practice many aspects remain segregated. |
| Health and Social Welfare | unitary policy and delivery that ignores ethnic divisions in its design and discourses, but nevertheless pragmatically adjusts to it, while at the same time denying its relevance. |

Whilst this technocratic approach to public administration resulted in some real improvements by, for example, removing the provision of social housing as a source of discrimination, it has been argued that it had the effect of establishing a collusive relationship between the state and the drivers of conflict which, by never addressing the issues directly, may have had the unintended consequence of making matters worse, not better (Murtagh, 2003). These approaches did however, secure the continued delivery of public services during the worst years of the violence and were remarkably stable over decades. Thus research into health and social care services from the early 1970s and the late 1990s both concluded that these services were provided in a way that was professionally and administratively blind to the pervasive violence (Williamson and Darby, 1978; Smyth et al, 2001).

The introduction of market-based reforms in the 1990s in Northern Ireland as elsewhere in the UK with the consequent restructuring of public administration around the prescriptions of ‘new public management’ (Clarke and Newman, 1997), made little impact on this situation. Whilst relatively large sums of money now flowed from the state to voluntary organizations to provide public services under contract with the state, it was only with the reforms that followed the election victory of the Blair government in Britain in

1997 that relations between the third sector and the state were reformulated around ideas of partnership and co-governance (Kearney and Williamson, 2001; Lewis, 2004; Newman, 2001).

As with the other constituent parts of the UK, Northern Ireland acquired a ‘compact’ setting out general principles that would govern relations between the state and the third sector. As with the rest of the UK, a plethora of partnerships and other joint bodies were established across many areas of public policy (Kearney and Williamson, 2001). These changes coincided with the signing of the ‘Good Friday’ agreement in 1998 and the establishment of a local power-sharing executive government (since suspended). The new arrangements for governing Northern Ireland institutionalised these broader policy changes in a local setting and introduced a policy discourse that emphasised the importance of third sector participation in stable and effective governance (Acheson, 2005).

This discourse emphasised the role of voluntary and community based organizations as sources of social cohesion in a fragmented society and as essential partners in the modernisation of public services. But the implications of this discourse only became apparent in 2005, when in a radical policy switch government abandoned the technical conflict blind approach to public administration and introduced as a new paradigm for public administration the view that a core purpose of public policy would henceforth be to address division and conflict directly and promote a ‘shared future’ (OFMDFM, 2005). Public bodies would henceforth “set the pace on movement towards a shared society and should lead by example” (ibid: para 1.3.15). The proposal to use the policies and machinery of the welfare state as a means of establishing greater cross-community social cohesion, whilst clearly in the tradition of welfare state thinking about its social cohesion role, is an extremely radical departure in the Northern Ireland context. In this context, the role of the third sector was set out clearly:

There is a clear recognition that the voluntary and community sector has made a powerful contribution to the achievement of better relations between communities. It is important that that role is underscored, especially in the most disadvantaged and interface areas... The development of, and investment in, social capital – particularly bridging social capital – through community development can help promote relationships within and between communities (ibid: para 3.4.1, p. 57).

Evidence of a fragmented civil society in Northern Ireland

The research reported on here was designed to begin teasing out the relationship between third sector organizations and ethno-sectarian divisions and to establish the extent to which the ‘welfarist space’ in which they operated carried sufficient cross-community weight for cross-community trust-building to occur. It asked firstly, to what extent were voluntary and community organizations embedded in each of the two main ethno-sectarian groups and secondly to what extent there was cross-community contact in their activities and whether and in what circumstances such contact addressed issues of communal conflict. In designing the research, it seemed to the research team that too much was being assumed in policy about the possibilities of joint action around shared social problems as a basis for such trust building without taking cognizance of the political context in which such action was attempted.

Methodology

The research comprised preliminary interviews and two main stages. Six scoping interviews were carried out with leading ‘experts’ in civil society and community relations in Northern Ireland, chosen from a mixture of government agencies and organizations in civil society. These interviews were audio taped and transcribed in full and subject to a manual content analysis. They were designed to elicit a range of views on perceptions of the central issues and were used to help design the research instruments. The latter comprised a two stage design. The first part was a postal questionnaire sent to a sample of 535 organizations. The

sampling frame ‘piggy-backed’ on an earlier survey into volunteer management committees in which a questionnaire had been sent to the known population of voluntary and community associations in Northern Ireland (NIVDA, 2003). Our sampling frame comprised all the respondents to this survey, already validated as representative of the population as a whole (NIVDA, 2003). A total of 358 responses was achieved, a response rate of 67%. Of these, 135 (37.7% of respondents) supplied additional written comments. These were analysed using n-vivo qualitative data analysis software.

The second stage of the design comprised six area case studies. The areas covered two urban areas in each of Derry and Belfast and two other towns and their immediate rural hinterlands, one in the east of Northern Ireland with a majority Protestant population and one in the west, with a majority Catholic population. In each area, semi-structured interviews were carried out with leaders (either paid staff or chair people of management committees) of between six and eight organizations, varying in type from large service providing or social economy organizations to small community-based self-help organizations. In each area interviews were also conducted with officials in local government offices. The interviews were audio recorded, transcribed in full and analysed using n-vivo data analysis software.

During the fieldwork and write up stages a research reference group which consisted in interested practitioners from third sector organizations and government agencies who were themselves not interview subjects met with the research team to provide comment on the instruments and the data as it emerged.

Some key Findings.

Third sector organizations in Northern Ireland, whatever their ostensible purposes, are to a considerable degree embedded in either of the two main ethno-sectarian blocks. Measured by communal affiliation of management committee or Board membership, it was found that only between one fifth and one quarter (22.5%) of the sample had mixed management committees in that no more than 60 per cent of members were either Protestant or Catholic. A similar proportion (23%) was either wholly Catholic or wholly Protestant. The remaining 40.5% were either mostly Protestant or mostly Catholic. Thus 73.9% of organizations were found to have committees that were either wholly or mainly from one community or the other. The summary results are set out in Table Two.

Table Two
Communal affiliation of Northern Ireland Voluntary Sector Management Committees

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid percent |
|-------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| Wholly Catholic | 40 | 11.2 | 13.1 |
| Mostly Catholic | 69 | 19.4 | 22.5 |
| Mixed | 80 | 22.5 | 26.1 |
| Mostly Protestant | 75 | 21.1 | 24.5 |
| Wholly Protestant | 42 | 11.8 | 13.7 |
| Missing | 50 | 14.0 | 100 |
| <i>Total</i> | 356 | 100 | |

Note: Wholly Catholic =100% Catholic, Mostly Catholic = >60% Catholic, Mixed =< 60% Protestant/Catholic, Mostly Protestant = >60% Protestant, Wholly Protestant =100% Protestant.

What difference did this communal structure of management committees make to the ability of these organizations to facilitate joint activities among Catholics and Protestants around a common cause or interest? In a society as highly segregated in patterns of every day living as Northern Ireland, the extent to which such cross community activity takes place should be considered a fundamental pre-condition to the creation of bridging social capital (assuming the socialization hypothesis holds).

Table Three
Organizations providing cross-community opportunities: Numbers answering ‘yes’

| | numbers | Valid percentage |
|--|----------------|-------------------------|
| Opportunities to do things together | 325 | 96.2 |
| Opportunities to cooperate on common task | 304 | 93 |
| Encouragement to work on cross-community issues | 202 | 65 |

The results reported in Table three show that almost all respondents (96.2%) thought their organizations provided opportunities for people from differing backgrounds to do things together. While the proportion drops to just under two thirds (65%) when it was a matter of encouragement to work on explicit cross-community issues, nevertheless the evidence shows that the activities of third sector organizations are an important site for mixing across the ethno-sectarian divide. This was reflected in the 65.7% of respondents who reported cross-community friendships and socializing to take place as a result of the opportunities to meet and work together that their organizations provided and the low levels of anxiety expressed. Respondents were asked to state the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “People in my organization would feel anxious about mixing with people in the other community”. Over 85% of those who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed.

However, some important caveats must be entered here. Only 30.1% of respondents said that the question of Protestants and Catholics working together was addressed directly in discussions about organizations’ work. A larger proportion of organizations addressed equality of access to services, where 60.1% of respondents reported doing so and for the large majority of these (78.1%) it was not at all divisive. These results suggest that the issue of Protestant Catholic relations is most readily addressed within the context of the service functions of organizations, but that there is a resistance to confronting the issue in more general contexts.

There were differences in the responses of the Protestant and the Catholic organizations to these questions. Taking together and comparing organizations that are wholly and mostly Catholic with those that are wholly and mostly Protestant, it is evident that the Protestant organizations are much less likely to engage with issues to do with cross-community working. The summary results are set out in Table four. They show that a notably higher proportion of the all Catholic organizations both being willing to discuss Catholics and Protestants working together and to address the issue of equality of access to services than was the case for the all Protestant group of organizations.

Table Four
Proportion of organizations indicating a willingness to engage in cross-community discussion by Catholic and Protestant organizations

| | Catholics and Protestants working together: % saying 'yes' | Equal access to services for Catholics and Protestants: % saying 'yes' |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|
| All Catholic organizations | 41.5 | 71.4 |
| All Protestant organizations | 25.4 | 49.1 |
| All organizations | 33.2 | 60.0 |

Significance levels: chi sq=6.39, df(1), p < 0.05 chi sq=11.17, df(1), p< 0.01

Thus behind a general reluctance among respondents to explicitly address issues of the two ethno-sectarian groups working together outside the context of providing equality of access to services, lie important differences between those that have wholly or mostly Protestant committees or boards and those that have wholly or mostly Catholic committees or boards in that there was considerably greater reluctance not only to address these issues directly, but even to ensure equality of access to services among Protestant organizations than there were among Catholic organizations. It is perhaps particularly noteworthy that less than half of Protestant organizations reported discussing equality of access to services.

These findings suggest that whilst there would appear to be a great deal of mixing across communal divisions among all respondents, this would also appear to be done in such a way that explicit cross-community issues are not addressed, in many cases even to the extent of discussing equality of access to services. Furthermore it is clear that the degree to which organizations are embedded in one or the other of the two main ethno-sectarian groups in Northern Ireland influences the likelihood of addressing cross-community issues in an explicit way.

The qualitative data, both the further comments provided by the questionnaire respondents and the interview data throw further light on the ways in which organizations negotiate the realities of working in such a deeply divided society. Three main coping mechanisms are suggested.

First are those that tend to deny that the issue is at all relevant. Respondents in this category were all from organizations that addressed the perceived needs of a group of people with a named physical impairment or medical condition. Most were small and reliant on volunteers, although this was not always the case as the following responses from an organization with professional staff as well as an extensive network of volunteers attests:

Our society and its members (whether they be a committee member or a member living with (name of medical condition)) are not interested in the religion of a fellow member - (the condition) and its problems are their main concerns. The members want to support each other and their carers, regardless of the stage their (condition) is at or whether they be mobile or not.

The concern here is with protecting the primacy of the medical condition as the focus of the organization's activities; but there appears to be an assumption that any attempt to address

topics such as the cross-community impact of the work would pose a threat. It may simply be easier to work on the assumption that because the condition can affect anybody, the organization's neutrality and accessibility is self-evident.

In this, these respondents shared a position adopted by the second and the most common of the three categories, those that tended to assume that their work was cross-community, but who offered no evidence to support this assumption. Some responses appeared more thoughtful than others, but in general the assumption tended to be made on the basis of the non-communal focus of the organizations' purposes. There thus appeared to be a tendency among respondents from organizations that dealt with themes or issues that cut across communal divisions to assume that this meant their work was cross community in fact.

We're not interested in people's background; we're not interested in their political allegiance – we're interested in delivering a service for people in need and to alleviate loneliness; to stop all this isolation that they've got. And one thing I will say is that we've worked on a lot of sides for thirty years and we never, ever, ever come up against any problems... We're non-political, very non-political – we work from a Christian ethos which is that we are here to serve the community wherever that community comes from within the district. And the board of directors reflect that... We've always worked... we're not interested in people's religion – that's of no interest whatsoever. It's if someone is in need then that's what our mission is.

The determination to work from an ideology of need that denied the relevance of ethno-sectarian divisions was based on the view that because need was an indivisible concept, the integrity of the organization's response to that need was sufficient to give it cross-community purchase. Evidence was not necessary or sought. For some, this was a virtue as it enabled the building of cross-community coalitions to address common problems. By deliberately avoiding the issue, organizations were opening up a civic space in which people from widely differing political and religious backgrounds could meet and share concerns. Avoidance from this perspective was seen as a positive virtue.

Our work is a reversal of active community relations. By treating disability inclusively we bypass sectarian Catholic / Protestant issues. This is why Peace funding is not accessible to our group because we deliberately do not record Catholic / Protestant at our events. However, by focusing on issues affecting families of disabled children, we include everyone who wants to be included, no matter what their religion. In a recent housing campaign we engaged all 18 Northern Ireland MPs in support of this issue, and with parents, community and voluntary groups, researchers, housing officials and occupational therapists, we managed to change policy. Policy at that time seemed to be impossible to change. Religion did not feature and I feel this is the way forward.

Such an approach is underpinned by a pervasive feature of life in Northern Ireland, that of adhering to a norm of knowing what not to say in order to avoid causing offence. Thus one questionnaire respondent commented:

Our group has approximately 40 to 50 members. I make sure, as secretary, that we DO NOT (emphasis in original) have speakers that would hold views that would annoy the members. Over the years we have had priests, clergymen, etc as speakers and members... At the February meeting when your questionnaire was discussed, folk felt that the questions did not apply to our group and if we queried into them it could rouse discord.

The third strategy of direct engagement with the consequences of ethno-sectarian division we found to be much less common. Most respondents had ensured that 'politics' was written out of their organizations' constitutions, but we found one economic and social development agency in a Catholic area that had deliberately written cross-community relations into its constitution and its aims and objectives. The respondent from this organization commented that as a consequence the organization was not free to ignore the issue, even when things were going badly. In another case of an organization providing services

to adult disabled people, the view that disability meant that other identities could safely be ignored was rejected out of hand.

There is this tendency to say, oh, you know, we're all different... in terms of disability – disability knows no boundaries, disability knows no barriers, etc, etc. Bullshit – because we all have barriers and we all have boundaries and they're there... you're talking about sexuality and the person opposite you says, 'I suppose there'd be no gay people here?' and you go, 'Why?' and it's merely, like, well you can't be gay and have a disability, or, you can't be sectarian and have a disability and it's something that does not protect us from the prejudices that the rest of society has – we have them all. You know, if you don't think of a person with a disability as a sexual person then you don't have to deal with that issue. If you don't think of them as a sectarian person then you don't have to deal with it.

This was a very unusual view. Generally many organizations appeared to be most comfortable with a strategy that protected their work on problems that penetrated both ethno-sectarian groups in Northern Ireland by either avoiding the issue of ethno-sectarian division or by assuming their cross-community credentials were self-evident because the problems they were addressing penetrated both groups. However, for organizations operating in areas that abutted interfaces with other areas dominated by the other main ethno-sectarian group, the issue was unavoidable. In these cases we found that where ethno-sectarian competition between groups remained strong and was punctuated by period outbreaks of violence along interface areas, the organizations themselves were not in a position to establish the necessary trust across these divisions for joint work to move forward. Only where there was a relatively stable political settlement locally was it possible for such bridge building activities to take hold. Even here, it was clear that a great deal depended on personal relationships being built between individual community leaders, either paid staff or unpaid committee members. Removing even one of these people from the situation meant that cross-community initiatives could be put on hold.

Some implications of the Northern Ireland findings

Evidence from Northern Ireland presented here shows how third sector organizations tend to manage the cross-community contact they engender by not addressing directly the fact that it is cross-community. Whilst the evidence suggests that most organizations provide opportunities for people from both main ethno-sectarian groups to do things together, only a minority address the implications of this for broader issues of cross community relations. The data suggests that most organizations negotiate the dilemmas of working in a deeply segregated society either by denying its relevance or by assuming that their integrity in addressing social and/or economic need is sufficient proof of their cross-community credentials. There is some evidence of avoidance of contentious issues either out of a determination not to offend, or as a deliberate means to building cross-community coalitions around shared issues. Where there is cross-community contact between organizations, this tended to be limited to the function around which the contact had arisen, particularly around joint participation in Government led partnership initiatives.

The extent of inter-communal mixing in the course of organizational activities and the lack of anxiety that was reported suggests that inter-personal trust was quite readily generated at this level. However, the resistance indicated by many organizations towards addressing cross-community issues head on might suggest that this trust was won at the cost of avoiding the hard questions. Further research would be necessary to establish the extent to which this was true at the level of individual organizations. But the difficulty in establishing cross-community trust in circumstances where the need to address ethno-sectarian differences is unavoidable, for example in interface areas, does suggest that the ready access to inter-personal trust in other circumstances is related to the fact that ethno-sectarian differences can be avoided.

The evidence supports Darby's (1986) insight that patterns of avoidance and functional integration are central to how people in Northern Ireland manage life in a deeply divided society. The conditional nature

of the linkage between social norms and networks on the one hand and generalized trust on the other (Anheier and Kendall, 2002) is also clearly illustrated. The qualitative data, in particular shows how in many organizations there are social norms of avoidance that ensure that generalized trust does not develop. In these cases the social capital that is generated is functional for the purposes of the organizations concerned in that they can pursue their missions as they see fit, but does not necessarily develop into generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that cross ethno-sectarian barriers outside those specific contexts. Where it was possible to develop explicit inter-community trust, even to a limited extent, this depended on a relatively stable local politics and a reduction in ethno-sectarian competition at the local level. We found no evidence of inter-community trust being developed solely through the efforts of the organizations themselves.

The Northern Ireland evidence presented here confirms the implausibility of the socialization hypothesis as a general theory of social solidarity. In cases such as this the fracturing of the relationship between norms and generalized trust means that third sector organizations cannot be treated as independent sources of bridging social capital and that policies that proceed on the understanding that they are, are likely to fail. In reconfiguring the welfare state, the creation of partnerships and other models of inter-agency working do not in themselves add to social solidarity across ethnic or other fundamental social cleavages. Further empirical support for this view can be found in a recent large scale attitudinal study of participants in voluntary associations in the Flemish part of Belgium where an extreme right wing political party very hostile to ethnic minorities has taken a substantial share of the vote (Hooghe, 2003). This study was designed to test the hypothesis that participation in voluntary associations led to less ethnocentric attitudes, once a strong self-selection effect had been taken account of. Given that participants in voluntary association activity were likely to hold less ethnocentric views than Flemish people did as a whole, what if anything was the 'add on' value of participation? The study concluded that "only those organizations...that create interaction environments that are hostile to the expression of ethnocentric stereotypes effectively reduce ethnocentrism levels" (Hooghe, 2003: 106).

As the evidence reported here and this Flemish study emphasise, participation on its own is not enough to overcome inter-ethnic distrust. Only in those cases where the issue was directly addressed were attitudes affected. Theories from social psychology can help explain why this should be so. The contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) proposed that inter-group conflict can be reduced by bringing people together from opposing groups, subject to four conditions: equal status between groups, a requirement of cooperation between groups, competition between the groups should be avoided and lastly, that the context of inter-group contact should be legitimised through institutional support (Niens, Cairns and Hewstone, 2003). Brown and Hewstone (2005) note that Allport's formulation has stood the test of time well, but they have argued that for inter-group contact to be most effective in reducing inter-group anxiety, contact with the requisite social identity 'switched on' was necessary (Hewstone and Brown 1986; Niens, Cairns and Hewstone, 2003).

The implications for the future of third sector participation in welfare state restructuring as a means for strengthening their capacity for engendering social solidarity are clear, particularly in cases where there are ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages. Increasing opportunities for participation in policy formulation and in service delivery will not be enough on their own. Welfare, in this sense cannot 'stand in' for other issues of conflict, whether they are long-standing and deep-seated or whether they have arisen, as in much of contemporary Europe, as a result of the influx of migrant labour. In turn, this has profound implications for the future of welfare states as integrative in circumstances where the stable political settlements and clear national communities on which they were based come under increasing pressure from globalization. The power of welfare state institutions to effect greater integration in the end relies on strong states underpinned by secure political settlements that can channel and regularise conflict in productive ways. In those circumstances the civic participation provided by third sector organizations can play its part, but it cannot be a substitute for it.

Bibliography

Acheson, N., B. Harvey, J. Kearney, A. Williamson (2004). Two Paths, One Purpose: Voluntary Action in Ireland, North and South. Dublin, Institute of Public Administration.

Acheson, N. (2005). How the glue became unstuck. Government Grant-Making and the Search for Social Cohesion in a Fractured Society: The Case of Northern Ireland. ESRC Seminar Series on grant making and grant makers, Centre for Charity Effectiveness, CASS Business School, City of London University, Centre for Charity Effectiveness.

Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice, Addison Wesley.

Anheier, H., J. Kendall (2002). "Interpersonal trust and voluntary associations: examining three approaches." British Journal of Sociology **53**(3): 343-362.

Anheier, H. (2004). Third Sector -Third Way: Comparative Perspectives and Policy Reflections. Welfare State Change: Towards a Third Way? J. Lewis and R. Surender (Ed). Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Brown, R., M. Hewstone (2005). "An integrative theory of inter-group contact." Advances in Experimental Social Psychology **37**: 255 - 343.

Clarke, J., J Newman (1997). The Managerial State: Power, Politics and Ideology in the Remaking of Social Welfare, Sage Publications.

Cochrane, F., S. Dunn (2002). People Power? The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector in the Northern Ireland Conflict. Cork, Cork University Press.

Darby, J. (1986). Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland. Dublin, Gill and MacMillan.

Darby, J., N. Dodge and A.C. Hepburn, Ed. (1990). Political Violence: Ireland in Comparative Perspective. Belfast, Appletree Press.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge, Polity Press.

Evers, A., J-L Laville (2004). Defining the Third Sector in Europe. The Third Sector in Europe. J.-L. Laville. A. Evers (Ed). Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar.

Foley, M. W., Bob Edwards (1999). "Is it Time to disinvest in social capital?" Journal of Public Policy **19**(2): 141-173.

Habermas, J. (1984 and 1987). The Theory of Communicative Action vols 1 and 2. Boston, MA, Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1989/1962). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

- Habermas, J. (1992). Further Reflections on the Public Sphere. Habermas and the Public Sphere. C. Calhoun (Ed). Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
- Hall, P., A. (1999). "Social Capital in Britain." British Journal of Politics **29**: 417 - 461.
- Harbison, J., Anna Manwah Lo (2004). The impact of devolution on community relations. Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: the Ninth Report. P. Devine. K. Lloyd, A.M. Gray, D. Heenan (Ed). London, Pluto Press.
- Hargie, O., D. Dickson, Ed. (2003). Researching the Troubles: Social Science Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict. Edinburgh and London, Mainstream Publishing.
- Harriss, J., P. de Renzio (1997). "'Missing Link' or Analytically Missing? The Concept of Social Capital. An Introductory Bibliographic Essay." Journal of International Development **9**(7): 919-937.
- Hayes, B., I. McAllister (2004). "Who Backs the Bombers?". Fortnight: 11-12.
- Hewstone, M., R. Brown (1986). Contact is not enough: An intergroup perspective on the 'contact hypothesis'. Contact and conflict in inter-group encounters. R. Brown, M. Hewstone (Ed). Oxford, Blackwell.
- Hillyard, P. G. Kelly, E. McLaughlin, D. Patsios, M. Tomlinson (2003). Bare Necessities: Poverty and Social Exclusion In Northern Ireland - Key Findings. Belfast, Democratic Dialogue.
- Hooghe, M. (2003). Voluntary associations and democratic attitudes: Value congruence as a causal mechanism. Generating social capital: Civil society and institutions in comparative perspective. D. Stolle, M. Hooghe (Ed). Houndsmill, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kearney, J. P., A.P. Williamson (2001). The Voluntary and Community Sector in Northern Ireland: developments since 1995/96. Next Steps in Voluntary Action: An analysis of five years of developments in the voluntary sector in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. London, Centre for Civil Society, LSE and NCVO.
- Kendall, J. (2003). The Voluntary Sector: Comparative Perspectives in the U.K. London and New York, Routledge.
- Kumlin, S., B. Rothstein (2005). "Making and breaking social capital: The impact of welfare state institutions." Comparative Political Studies **38**(4): 339 - 365.
- Lewis, J. (2004). The State and the Third Sector in Modern Welfare States: Independence, Instrumentality, Partnership. The Third Sector in Europe. A. Evers, J.-L. Laville (Ed). Cheltenham, Northampton, Mass, Edward Elgar.
- Marshall, T. H., T. Bottomore (1950, 1992). Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge and London, Cambridge University Press, Pluto Press.
- Murtagh, B. (2002). The Politics of Territory: Policy and Segregation in Northern Ireland. Basingstoke, New York, Palgrave.

- Murtagh, B. (2003). Territoriality, Research and Policy Making in Northern Ireland. Researching the Troubles: Social Science Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict. O. Hargie, D. Dickson (Ed) Edinburgh and London, Mainstream Publishing.
- Newman, J. (2001). Modernizing Governance: New Labour, Policy and Society. London, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications.
- NICVA (1998). State of the Sector II. Belfast, Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action.
- NICVA (2001). State of the Sector III. Belfast, Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action.
- NICVA (2005). State of the Sector IV. Belfast, Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action.
- Niens, U., E. Cairns, M. Hewstone (2003). Contact and conflict in Northern Ireland. Researching the Troubles: Social science perspectives on the Northern Ireland conflict. O. Hargie, D. Dickson (Ed) Edinburgh, Mainstream publishing.
- NIVDA (2003). Committee Matters: an assessment of the characteristics, training needs and governance role of voluntary management committees in Northern Ireland. Belfast, Northern Ireland Volunteer Development Agency.
- Offe, C. (1984). Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, Mass, MIT University Press.
- OFMDFM (2005). "A Shared Future: Policy and Strategy Framework for Good Relations in Northern Ireland". Belfast, Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.
- Pierson, C. (1998) Beyond the Welfare State: The New Political Economy of Welfare. Cambridge, Polity Press
- Pierson, P. (2001). The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Putnam, R., D. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
- Putnam, R., D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York, London, Simon & Schuster.
- Putzel, J. (1997). "Accounting for the 'Dark Side' of Social Capital: Reading Robert Putnam on Democracy." Journal of International Development 9(7): 939-949.
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1994). "The hollowing out of the state." Political Quarterly 21: 181-205.
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham, Open University Press.
- Rothstein, B., D. Stolle (2003). Social Capital, Impartiality and the Welfare State. Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective. M. Hooghe, D. Stolle (Ed). Houndsmill, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ruane, J., J. Todd (1996). The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, conflict and emancipation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

- Salamon, L., H. Anheier. (1998). "Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross-Nationally." Voluntas **9**(3): 213 - 248.
- Shirlow, P., B. Murtagh (2006). Belfast: Segregation, Violence and the City. London, Pluto Press.
- Smyth, M., M. Morrissey, J. Hamilton (2001). Caring through the Troubles: Health and Social Services in North and West Belfast. Belfast, Institute for Conflict Research, North and West Belfast Health and Social Services Trust.
- Surender, R. (2004). Modern Challenges to the Welfare State and the Antecedents of the Third Way. Welfare State Change: Towards a Third Way? R. Surender, J. Lewis (Ed). Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Stolle, D. (2003). The Sources of Social Capital. Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective. M. Hooghe, D. Stolle (Ed). New York and Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tarrow, S. (1996). "'Making Social Science Work across Time and Space: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*". " American Political Science Review **90**: 389 - 397.
- Taylor, M. (2004). The Welfare Mix in the United Kingdom. The Third Sector in Europe. J.-L. Laville., A. Evers (Ed) Cheltenham, UK., Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar.
- Titmuss, R. (1958). Essays on the Welfare State. London, George Allen and Unwin.
- van Oorshot, W., W. Arts (2005). "The social capital of European welfare states: the crowding out hypothesis revisited." Journal of European Social Policy **15**(1): 5 - 26.
- Williamson, A., J. Darby (1978). Social Welfare Services. Violence and the Social Services in Northern Ireland. . J. Darby, A. Williamson (Ed) London, Heinemann Educational Books.
- Wollebaek, D., P. Selle (2002). "Does participation in voluntary associations contribute to social capital? The impact of intensity, scope and type." Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly **31**(1): 32 - 61.
- Woolcock, M. (1998). "Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and policy framework." Theory and Society **27**: 151-208.
- Wright, F. (1996). Two Lands on One Soil: Ulster Politics before Home Rule. Dublin, Gill and Macmillan.